This paper addresses the questions whether European mutual fund managers rely on sell-side analyst information with respect to their investment decisions and whether this behavior impacts fund performance. Based on a sample of over 4,300 European mutual funds and around 1.2 million portfolio changes, we not only use consensus stock recommendations and earnings forecast revisions as forecast measures but, additionally, focus on implied return revisions, based on target prices.
Introduction
The impact of sell-side analysts' research on stock markets has been documented by many previous papers (e.g., Asquith et al., 2005) . Therefore, it is not farfetched to assume that one group of market participants that might make use of this informative source are mutual fund managers. Systematic short-term evaluations, limited time capacities, and information overload from various sources provoke managers' need for a detailed summary of future prospects of different stock alternatives. Professional research analysts providing forward-looking opinions can act as such a summarizing source (e.g., Elton et al., 1986) .
In line with the argument that most fund families are too small to offer comprehensive in-house research (Brown et al., 2012) , O'Brien and Bhushan (1990) suppose that sell-side analysts act as information intermediaries to institutional investors. Due to their industry expertise research analysts are much more specialized and should perform the task of analyzing companies better than mutual fund managers that possess a rather general perspective. Analyst research also helps institutional investors to satisfy fiduciary duties and to stick with their internal decision making policies (e.g., O'Brien and Bhushan, 1990; Frankel et al., 2006) . Furthermore, we expect sell-side research to be valuable as the subscription is quite costly and mutual fund managers often pay for this information with soft-dollar commissions (see Conrad et al., 2001 ). This paper addresses the question whether European mutual fund managers rely on sellside analyst information when trading stocks and whether those trades that are in line with analyst forecast revisions outperform trades that are contrary to analyst research. The effect of research analysts on institutional investment decisions has been analyzed by only a limited number of empirical studies employing mostly U.S. data. For example, Chen and Cheng (2006) find that changes in aggregate U.S. institutional ownership is positively correlated with consensus recommendations. They measure more buyer-initiated than seller-initiated large trades around favorable recommendations and vice versa for unfavorable recommendations. In a recent working paper, Costello and Hall (2011) Despite the awareness that the responsiveness of a fund manager's trades to changes in analysts' recommendations decreases in the manager's skill (Kacperczyk and Seru, 2007) , a large number of fund managers seem to pay attention to analyst reports. On the one hand, Brown et al. (2012) document that analyst recommendation revisions can drive herd behavior among U.S. mutual funds. Mutual funds seem to herd into stocks with consensus sell-side upgrades and herd out of stocks with consensus downgrades. On the other hand, Chan et al. (2005) detect herding in response to the lack of reliable information, measured through the dispersion of analysts' earnings forecasts.
We present several results that contribute to the literature and shed light on the impact of sell-side analyst research on mutual fund trading. First, we conduct one of the first studies that analyzes this effect among a large sample of over 4,300 European mutual funds across a broad stock universe. Second, we extend the existing literature by analyzing three different measures reflecting analyst forecast revisions. While prior studies only focus on recommendation changes and earnings forecast revisions (e.g., Cheng, 2006, and Brown et al., 2012) , we additionally include implied return revisions as analyst forecast measure into our analyses. We ascribe the assumed importance of implied returns, measured as the ratio of an analyst's target price forecast relative to the prevailing stock price, to the findings of Asquith et al. (2005) and Brav and Lehavy (2003) . Both studies document that target price revisions contain valuable information apart from earnings forecasts and stock recommendation revisions for capital markets.
Third, we combine our analyses with results from the corporate governance literature.
Based on the findings that institutional investors (and their monitoring efforts) translate into higher earnings quality (see, e.g., Velury and Jenkins, 2006) and the result that the quality of financial disclosure and the quality of analyst research are complements (Lang and Lundholm, 1996, and Frankel et al., 2006) , we proxy the quality of analyst research by the firm-specific level of institutional ownership. This setting allows us to analyze if not only the market as a whole realizes the positive impact of institutional ownership on analyst research (see Frankel et al., 2006) , but also fund managers as one specific group of market experts.
And finally, we contribute to the literature by analyzing if following sell-side analyst research influences the performance of the funds' stock trades more positively than an investment behavior that contradicts analyst forecasts.
With respect to our findings, results show that mutual fund portfolio weight changes positively correlate with each consensus revision forecast measure when analyzing the three analyst measures separately. European mutual funds significantly increase (decrease) their holdings in stocks when the consensus stock recommendation, earnings forecast, or implied return forecast increases (decreases) within the quarter prior to the observation period. The results regarding the first two forecast measures are in line with the existing literature (see, e.g., Brown et al., 2012) . Regarding the implied return forecast revision, to the best of our knowledge, no other study has yet analyzed its impact on investment decisions of mutual fund managers. Nevertheless, our findings complement those of Brav and Lehavy (2003) who
show that target prices contain investment value for market participants in general.
To simultaneously condition on the information conveyed through each of the other two consensus revision measures, we run a regression including all three different consensus forecast measures. Results show that the earnings revision measure and the implied return revision measure significantly influence European mutual fund managers' trading decisions, when considering the revision measures simultaneously, whereas the consensus recommendation revision does no longer impact fund managers. One explanation of the reduced economic impact of the recommendation revision variable on mutual fund trading (once controlling for the other two measures) might be reduced informativeness of the measure itself due to potential conflicts of interests (see, e.g., Agrawal and Chen, 2008) .
Next, we focus on different consensus forecast characteristics that might translate into higher informativeness of analyst research. Our results show that mutual funds appear to rather increase their holdings based on consensus recommendation upgrades compared to their reduction in holdings based on consensus recommendation downgrades. This finding is in line with Costello and Hall (2011) . While we can also confirm this observation for earnings forecast revisions, we find European fund managers to use both positive and negative information, in terms of implied return forecast revisions, to base their trading decisions on.
We also show that consensus forecast revisions based on a broader analyst coverage (in terms of the number of consensus inputs) have a higher impact on European mutual fund holding changes. This can be explained by the finding of Alford and Berger (1999) and a stock universe including 3,840 different equities worldwide (see Table 1 ).
In accordance with other studies, we infer the fund trading activity from changes of portfolio weights rather than changes in the number of stocks held (e.g., Grinblatt et al., 1995, and Costello and Hall, 2011 ). Thereby we also capture managers' "passive" responses to analyst revisions, even if they do not trade the respective stock. For instance, fund managers that maintain the same number of shares of a downgraded stock can decrease their exposure to it by allocating incoming fund flows to other stocks (Costello and Hall, 2011). 2 At the end of every six-month formation period, we calculate a given stock's portfolio weight within a given fund as the ratio of the position's market value to the market value of the entire fund portfolio. Then, our core variable Percentage_Holding_Change is computed as the portfolio weight change of the given fund position within the given period. 4 In order to eliminate potential outliers, we exclude all Percentage_Holding_Change that represent the 1 st and 100 th percentiles. Except for the logarithm of the stocks' size and price-to-book ratio, we also apply this exclusion to our independent variables which are introduced in the following section. 5 Note that the trading numbers displayed refer to active buying and selling activity. The core variable Percentage_Holding_Change has a higher frequency due to the passive portfolio weight changes mentioned above.
The stocks included were either listed in the U.S., the EU5 (i.e., France, Germany, Italy, Spain, the United Kingdom), Switzerland, or Japan between 2005 and 2009. According to Bloomberg, these eight markets constitute 56% of the world's total market capitalization per June 2010.
We obtain three different measures that reflect the analysts' opinions regarding the equities from FactSet. The information derived from the individual equity reports includes stock recommendations, target price forecasts, and earnings forecasts. The FactSet scale for recommendations ranges from 1 to 5, with 1 indicating a "strong buy", 2 a "buy", 3 a "hold", 4 a "sell" and 5 a "strong sell". In order to ease the interpretation, we reverse the scale so that a high numeric number indicates a favorable recommendation, while a lower number indicates a less favorable recommendation. Earnings forecasts are reported for the upcoming fiscal year and displayed as earnings per share (EPS). Further, we calculate the implied return (IR) of individual analysts' target prices by dividing the reported target price by the current stock price of the report date, minus one.
6
For a given stock in a given calendar quarter (stock-quarter), we calculate the consensus of each analyst measure as the mean of all outstanding reports that were issued within the respective 90 days. To satisfy the notion of an equally weighted opinion across all active analysts, we only include the latest outstanding report of a single analyst on a single stock, if she issues more than one report within a quarter. Since we focus on institutional trading in accordance with analysts' consensus opinions, we require at least three different analysts to cover a given stock within a given calendar quarter. Further, we exclude stocks that trade below €5, since "they are generally illiquid, and are likely to have scarce fund holdings and analyst coverage" (Brown et al., 2012) . 6 We use IR forecasts instead of target price forecasts for our analyses because IR forecasts incorporate stock prices and therefore better reflect analysts' beliefs of potential upward momentum. The impact of momentum trading strategies for mutual funds has been shown by many studies (e.g., Grinblatt et al., 1995) . Table 2 ).
Although the average recommendation seems fairly positive, this is in line with prior literature (see, e.g., Barber et al., 2006) showing that even after the implementation of NASD Recent studies have shown that the idiosyncratic volatility of European stocks has increased over the years (e.g., Kearney and Potì, 2008) . In other words, managers need more stocks in their portfolios to diversify away the unsystematic risk. Furthermore, fund managers might employ Value-at-Risk (VaR) or other market-sensitive risk management models to estimate probabilities of portfolio losses based on past prices and volatilities. Persaud (2002) states that such models prompt banks to sell when volatility rises or prices fall. On the opposite, Del Guercio (1996) and Falkenstein (1996) show that institutional investors exhibit a preference for more volatile stocks. In order to control for volatility, we also include the quarterly standard deviation of the daily stock returns (Vola_return) into our analyses.
Additionally, another control variable for investors' information environment is stock turnover. Our quarterly control variable Turn is computed as the average daily trading volume divided by the number of shares outstanding during the quarter.
With respect to the last control variable, Brown et al. (2012) argue that as a result of the censored nature of recommendations, analysts cannot revise their recommendations upward above a "strong buy", or downward below a "strong sell". To control for such cases, we include two dummy variables into our analyses. Since we display analysts' recommendations on a consensus level, we set the dummy Strong_buy to "1" when the consensus recommendation in the given and in the prior quarter is greater than or equal to 4.5, and "0"
otherwise. Further, we set the dummy Strong_Sell to "1" when the consensus recommendation in the given and in the prior quarter is less than or equal to 1.5, and "0" otherwise.
Mutual fund trading and analyst forecasts

Mutual fund trading and different types of analyst forecast revisions
Mutual fund managers are often perceived as experts regarding investment decisions and portfolio allocations. This is due to extensive education, manifold and preferential access to current and up-to-date databases, and their closeness to decision makers such as company management or industry experts. Concerning their access to databases, mutual fund managers might not only use databases that simply contain company information such as reported earnings or historic dividends but also subscribe to forward-looking analyst research. This could be the fact for at least three reasons: First, due to time constraints, mutual fund managers are unable to analyze all potential stock investments themselves. Hence, they outsource this important task to sell-side analysts that serve as intermediaries between companies and institutional investors (e.g., O'Brien and Bhushan, 1990 ). Second, due to their industry expertise research analysts are rather specialized and perform the task of analyzing companies better than mutual fund managers who have a more general perspective. Third, using analyst research helps institutional investors with regard to their internal decision making policies and for fiduciary reasons (see, e.g., O'Brien and Bhushan, 1990; Frankel et al., 2006) . Based on this, we argue that it should be possible to directly measure the impact of analyst research on mutual fund trading. Whereas it has been frequently shown by the literature (see, among a broad range of studies, Francis and Soffer, 1997; Brav and Lehavy, 2003; Asquith et al., 2005 ) that the revision of analysts' forecasts generally impacts stock prices 8 , so far only few studies have directly measured the impact of analysts' forecasts on the trading behavior of a specific group of market participants, namely mutual fund managers (see, e.g., Chen and Cheng, 2006; Kacperczyk and Seru, 2007; and Brown et al., 2012) . For causality reasons, we refrain from using contemporaneous regressors but calculate the regressors for the quarter prior to the observation period. 9 This is meant to guarantee that changes within analyst forecasts are available to all mutual fund managers prior to their investment decisions. All regressions are estimated using a fixed effects model that allows for cross-sectional and time dependence within our data. We include firm fixed effects and time dummies within all regression models. Furthermore, we compute robust standard errors clustered by the underlying firms (see Petersen, 2009 ).
[Insert Table 3 about here]
Column (1) of Table 3 uses the consensus stock recommendation revisions (Rec_Revision) to explain changes in mutual fund holdings. Based on more than 1.2 million observations, results show that the consensus revision of stock recommendations is positively associated with changes in mutual fund holding weights at the 1%-level. Hence, European mutual funds significantly increase (decrease) their holdings in stocks when the consensus recommendation increases (decreases) within the quarter prior to the observation period. A one level increase of consensus recommendation (e.g., from hold to buy) is associated with a 0.0106% point increase in mutual fund holdings of the respective stock. 10 With respect to the control variables, results show that fund holdings are adjusted to a lesser extend for larger companies whereas holding adjustments are higher for stocks with higher volatility and higher turnover. Since coefficients of control variables are rather stable, we refrain from discussing these results in the remainder of the paper. Nevertheless, all control variables 9 We define an observation period as the semi-annual period for which we can compute the weight changes of the mutual fund holdings.
10 Although this appears to be a rather small holding change, it is, nevertheless, economically significant as a 0.0106% point shift equals almost a duplication of the average Percentage_Holding_Change of 0.0135% (see Table 1 ).
remain included in all regressions. Our results are in line with Costello and Hall (2011) Within column (4) we now use all three different consensus forecast measures (recommendations, earnings forecasts, and implied return revisions) within one regression to simultaneously condition on the information conveyed through each of the other two consensus revision measures. Results show that two of the three revision measures 11 Since we only focus on prior-quarter analyst forecast revisions, we do not cover portfolio weight changes in response to analyst forecast revisions within the contemporaneous period. Similar to Brown et al. (2012), we find slightly stronger coefficients of the same-period revision variables in unreported analyses. However, as fund trades could occur contemporaneously with the release of analysts' forecasts, the direction of causality is less clear in these analyses.
(EPS_Revision and IR_Revision) play a significant role within European mutual fund managers' trading decisions, when considering the revision measures simultaneously. The coefficient of Rec_Revision (0.0047, t=1.20) not only loses its significance but is also much less relevant in economic terms, compared to the stand-alone model (column (1)). A one level increase (decrease) in consensus recommendation now only leads to a 0.0047% point increase (decrease) in mutual fund holdings. The reduced economic impact of the stock recommendation revision on mutual fund trading, once controlling for the other two measures, might be due to the limited number of categories (buy/hold/sell) that exist, and potential biases in the measure itself due to prevailing conflicts of interests (see, e.g., Agrawal and Chen, 2008) . Since we are the first to control for all three different revision measures, we cannot reference to other papers directly. However, as Asquith et al. (2005) have shown, once using revisions of earnings forecasts and target prices, the information conveyed within recommendation upgrades and downgrades of stocks loses much of its value.
12 Brown et al. (2012) also find that the impact of the recommendation revision variable on mutual fund herding decreases when jointly controlling for earnings revisions.
Mutual fund trading and the direction of consensus forecast revisions
It is important to analyze if mutual fund managers react differently to positive versus negative information included within analysts' forecasts. The literature sometimes argues that primarily negative forecast revisions contain investment value since analysts exhibit overoptimism within their forecasts due to conflicts of interests (see, e.g., Lin and McNichols, 1998; Barber et al., 2006) and only reluctantly issue negative information on companies to secure future business for their employers. However, it remains unclear to what extent 12 Within unreported regressions, we additionally regressed two of the three revision measures jointly (which adds to three more regressions to cover all possible combinations). Each time, both revision measures are significant and positively associated with European mutual fund holding changes. Nevertheless, we refrained from adding these additional regressions to the table since column (4) of Table 3 is the most complete in terms of available forecast revision variables.
specific investors react differently to positive versus negative forecasts while taking reduced information value based on potential conflicts of interests into account. Malmendier and Shanthikumar (2007) show that contrary to large traders who discount for the upward distortion of recommendations, small traders follow recommendations literally. Bradley et al.
(2008) also find that market participants do not adequately discount for affiliated-related optimism.
To control for potential differences between positive and negative forecast revisions, we do not use the revision measure itself but define two separate measures. For example,
Rec_Revision_Upgrade is set to Rec_Revision for positive revisions, and "0" otherwise, while Rec_Revision_Downgrade is equal to Rec_Revision for negative revisions, and "0"
otherwise. Similarly, we split the revision information for both other forecast measures (earnings and implied return) to account for potential differences.
[Insert Table 4 about here]
Results of Table 4 show that for the first two forecast measures (recommendation and earnings forecast revisions), mutual fund holding changes seem to be primarily associated with the positive information (see column (1) to (2) show that apart from recommendation revisions, target prices are also upwardly biased due to conflicts of interests. Hence, it could be perfectly possible that market participants such as (European) mutual fund managers know about the reduced information value within positive target price revisions and attribute a higher investment value to negative forecasts.
Mutual fund trading and the number of inputs forming consensus forecasts
We next focus on the question if mutual fund holding changes are related to the coverage intensity of a stock. We argue that a higher number of analysts providing inputs into the consensus forecast increases the reliability of each consensus forecast and, hence, the informativeness of those forecasts for mutual fund managers. Similar results have been displayed previously within the literature. Alford and Berger (1999) , for example, find that higher analyst following is associated with greater forecast accuracy. They ascribe this to the fact that analysts prefer to follow firms with less uncertainty (which ultimately results in higher forecast accuracy). As a second example, Schutte and Unlu (2009) 
Mutual fund trading and the change of dispersion of analyst forecasts
In this section, we investigate whether the intensity of mutual fund holding changes Hence, stocks where the dispersion of analyst forecasts is high signal high information uncertainty which consequently leads to herding among investors.
To control for these two competing options, we first calculate the dispersion as the standard deviation of all outstanding forecasts at the end of each quarter, scaled by the [Insert Table 6 about here]
Comparable to Table 3, Table 6 displays results for each revision measure on a standalone basis (column (1) to column (3)) and within one joint regression (column (4)). Based on the first three columns, results show that two of the three regressions display significantly negative interaction terms. These coefficients are highly significant at the 1%-level for recommendation revisions (column (1)) and slightly weaker but still significant at the 10%-level for earnings forecast revisions (column (2) 
Mutual fund trading and analyst forecasts in the light of different governance settings
The literature has shown that the information value of analyst research used by mutual fund managers for their investment decisions depends on the quality of financial reporting.
Since analysts employ information issued by firms for their forecasting models, they largely depend on the quality of financial reporting. Following Lang and Lundholm (1996) and Frankel et al. (2006) , the quality of financial disclosure and the quality of analyst research are complements. Consequently, the literature has tried to answer the question about the driving forces that determine high quality figures. Among other things, the quality of financial reporting is influenced by differences in the firm-specific level of institutional ownership (see, e.g., Yeo et al., 2002, and Velury and Jenkins, 2006) . Similarly, Beekes and Brown (2006) have shown that better-governed firms make more informative disclosures. Generally, the literature assumes that active monitoring performed by institutional investors (see, e.g.,
Chen et al., 2007) leads to higher earnings quality (and less earnings management).
Nevertheless, one needs to distinguish between foreign and local institutional investors.
Ferreira and Matos (2008) argue that foreign institutions are much more helpful within the monitoring process compared to domestic institutions since they have less incentive to retain future business with local companies and, hence, perform the monitoring task better.
Apart from the effect of ownership on the quality of financial reporting, institutional ownership also directly effects the work of financial analysts. Bhushan (1989) , for example, has shown that analyst following increases in institutional ownership. Ljungqvist et al. (2007) report that earnings forecasts are more accurate when institutional ownership is high. And finally, show that the informativeness of analyst research increases if corporate governance levels increase (measured by the effectiveness of shareholder protection laws and monitoring efforts due to institutional investors).
To control for the potential impact of domestic (foreign) institutional ownership, we add the prior-quarter, firm-specific level of domestic (foreign) institutional ownership within column (1) to (3) (column (4) to (6) Contrary to the first three models, columns (4) to (6) focus on the effect of foreign institutions. Of the three interaction terms, two coefficients are significantly positive, namely the interaction between Rec_Revision and Institutional Ownership at the 1%-level and the interaction between IR_Revision and Institutional Ownership at the 10%-level. Thus, our results show that analyst revisions have a higher impact on mutual fund holding changes in case of a higher level of foreign institutional ownership, relative to an average level of foreign ownership. One potential explanation for this result (insignificant interaction coefficients for domestic ownership compared to the significant interaction coefficients for foreign ownership) could be different levels of the quality of financial reporting due to differences in the effectiveness of monitoring by institutional investors. Consequently, such differences in reporting quality translate into differences in analyst forecasts which are less (more) valuable when there are more domestic (foreign) institutional investors.
The return of mutual fund trading in accordance with analyst forecasts
In the previous chapters, we have shown that European mutual fund managers rely on 
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The weight change of stock i
is calculated in accordance with equation (1) and, thus, controls for the impact of price changes. [Insert Table 8 about here]
For the purpose of simplicity, we first concentrate on raw returns and the findings with respect to Rec_Revision as analyst revision measure within our discussion of Table 8 .
Results of the stock purchases show that the average return of those stock trades where fund managers follow a consensus revision upgrade significantly outperforms the return of those stocks where managers decide to buy a stock despite a negative consensus revision prior to the trade (see equation (2) following stock recommendations. More precisely, they find that a change in institutional 16 Please note that a lower performance of SELL FOLLOWER compared to SELL CONTRARIAN shows that selling a stock for which a negative analyst revision is issued avoids underperformance and is therefore beneficial for fund managers.
ownership based on recommendations results in positive abnormal returns of around 1.05 % per quarter.
Within Richardson et al., 2004) . As mentioned before, we not only perform all analyses with raw returns but additionally focus on adjusted returns. revisions (see Section 3) but that this behavior also enhances fund performance.
Conclusion
This paper addresses the questions whether European mutual fund managers rely on sell-side analyst information when trading stocks and whether this behavior impacts fund performance. Since mutual fund managers are confronted with systematic short-term evaluations, limited time capacities, and information overload from various sources they might outsource the task of analyzing stocks to so-called sell-side analysts. Apart from the fact that most fund families are too small to offer comprehensive in-house research (see Brown et al., 2012) , analysts are also believed to be more specialized with respect to analyzing companies and, hence, act as efficient information intermediaries between investors and companies (e.g., O'Brien and Bhushan, 1990) . Another reason for mutual fund managers to rely on analyst research might also be fiduciary duties and internal decision making policies (see O'Brien and Bhushan, 1990, and Frankel et al., 2006) .
Whereas most research with respect to this question focuses on the U.S. market, we first contribute to the literature by conducting one of the first studies that analyzes this effect among a large sample of over 4,300 European mutual funds across a broad stock universe.
For this purpose, we use data of actively managed European equity funds from (Percentage_Holding_Change ) is defined as the portfolio weight change of a given fund position within a given semi-annual period. Thereby, we control for the impact of price changes. Rec_Revision is defined as the prior-quarter change in the consensus recommendation. EPS_Revision is the prior-quarter change in the earnings consensus forecast for the upcoming fiscal year scaled by shares outstanding. IR_Revision is the prior-quarter change in the consensus target price forecast scaled by price (i.e., implied return consensus revision). Return displays the priorquarter stock return. Size is the logarithm of the prior-quarter market capitalization. P-t-B-value is the logarithm of the stocks' prior-quarter price-to-book ratio. Vola_Return describes the standard deviation of the daily stock returns during the prior quarter. Turn is turnover, which is calculated as the average daily trading volume within the prior quarter, divided by the number of shares outstanding at the end of that quarter. Strong_Buy (Strong_Sell ) is a dummy variable that equals "1" for stocks with a consecutive consensus recommendation greater (less) than or equal to 4.5 (1.5) in the previous two quarters, and "0" otherwise. We display t-values of the coefficients in parentheses. The symbols, ***, **, and *, denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively. This table presents regression results of mutual fund trading on upwardly and downwardly revised analyst forecasts. Our dependent variable (Percentage_Holding_Change ) is defined as the portfolio weight change of a given fund position within a given semi-annual period. Thereby, we control for the impact of price changes. Rec_Revision_Upgrade (Rec_Revision_Downgrade ) is set to Rec_Revision (the prior-quarter change in the consensus recommendation) for upgrades (downgrades), and "0" otherwise. EPS_Revision_Upward (EPS_Revision_Downward ) is set to EPS_Revision (the prior-quarter change in the earnings per share consensus forecast) if the revision is positive (negative), and "0" otherwise. IR_Revision_Upward (IR_Revision_Downward ) is set to IR_Revision (the prior-quarter change in the consensus implied return forecast) if the revision is positive (negative), and "0" otherwise. Return displays the prior-quarter stock return. Size is the logarithm of the prior-quarter market capitalization. P-t-B-value is the logarithm of the stocks' prior-quarter price-to-book ratio. Vola_Return describes the standard deviation of the daily stock returns during the prior quarter. Turn is turnover, which is calculated as the average daily trading volume within the prior quarter, divided by the number of shares outstanding at the end of that quarter. Strong_Buy (Strong_Sell ) is a dummy variable that equals 1 for stocks with a consecutive consensus recommendation greater (less) than or equal to 4.5 (1.5) in the previous two quarters, and 0 otherwise. We display t-values of the coefficients in parentheses. The symbols, ***, **, and *, denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively. EPS_Revision is the prior-quarter change in the earnings consensus forecast for the upcoming fiscal year scaled by shares outstanding. IR_Revision is the prior-quarter change in the consensus target price forecast scaled by price (i.e., implied return consensus revision). Return displays the prior-quarter stock return. Size is the logarithm of the prior-quarter market capitalization. P-t-B-value is the logarithm of the stocks' prior-quarter price-to-book ratio. Vola_Return describes the standard deviation of the daily stock returns during the prior quarter. Turn is turnover, which is calculated as the average daily trading volume within the prior quarter, divided by the number of shares outstanding at the end of that quarter. Strong_Buy (Strong_Sell ) is a dummy variable that equals "1" for stocks with a consecutive consensus recommendation greater (less) than or equal to 4.5 (1.5) in the previous two quarters, and "0" otherwise. The variables Number of Cons. Inputs are centered around their mean values. Base coefficients on Rec_Revision , EPS_Revision , and IR_Revision are for a consensus revision that is average with respect to the number of consensus inputs. We display t-values of the coefficients in parentheses. The symbols, ***, **, and *, denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively. EPS_Revision is the prior-quarter change in the earnings consensus forecast for the upcoming fiscal year scaled by shares outstanding. EPS_Dispersion_Revision is measured as the prior-quarter change in earnings forecast dispersion. IR_Revision is the prior-quarter change in the consensus target price forecast scaled by price (i.e., implied return consensus revision). IR_Dispersion_Revision is measured as the prior-quarter change in implied return forecast dispersion. Return displays the prior-quarter stock return. Size is the logarithm of the prior-quarter market capitalization. P-t-B-value is the logarithm of the stocks' prior-quarter price-to-book ratio. Vola_Return describes the standard deviation of the daily stock returns during the prior quarter. Turn is turnover, which is calculated as the average daily trading volume within the prior quarter, divided by the number of shares outstanding at the end of that quarter. Strong_Buy (Strong_Sell ) is a dummy variable that equals "1" for stocks with a consecutive consensus recommendation greater (less) than or equal to 4.5 (1.5) in the previous two quarters, and "0" otherwise. We display t-values of the coefficients in parentheses. The symbols, ***, **, and *, denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively.
Dependent Variable: Percentage_Holding_Change (1) (2) (3) This table presents regression results of mutual fund trading on different types of analyst forecast revisions within different governance settings. Our dependent variable (Percentage_Holding_Change ) is defined as the portfolio weight change of a given fund position within a given semi-annual period. Thereby, we control for the impact of price changes. Institutional Ownership is a placeholder for domestic and foreign institutional ownership, as specified by the respective column headings, and equals the specific level of ownership of a given stock at the end of the prior quarter. Rec_Revision is defined as the prior-quarter change in the consensus recommendation. EPS_Revision is the prior-quarter change in the earnings consensus forecast for the upcoming fiscal year scaled by shares outstanding. IR_Revision is the prior-quarter change in the consensus target price forecast scaled by price (i.e., implied return consensus revision). All models include the same set of control variables as in Table 6 . We do not display the control coefficients for the sake of brevity. We center each Institutional Ownership value around its company-quarter mean. Base coefficients on Rec_Revision , EPS_Revision , and IR_Revision are for a consensus revision that is average with respect to the subject company's ownership variable considered. We display t-values of the coefficients in parentheses. The symbols, ***, **, and *, denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively. This table presents the average next-quarter returns of the stocks purchased (and sold) in accordance with and in contrast to prior-quarter forecast revisions. We calculate the average next-quarter returns for the trades of the respective sub-groups by multiplying the raw returns (or the returns adjusted by the returns of the MSCI World index) with the standardized weight change within a given trade portfolio (see equations (2) - (4)). For this calculation, we control for the impact of price changes. In Panel A, we define the buys during the recent six months in which funds follow upwardly revised prior-quarter forecasts (positive Rec_Revision EPS_Revision or IR_Revision ) as BUY FOLLOWER and the sells in line with downwardly revised prior-quarter forecasts (negative Rec_Revision , EPS_Revision or IR_Revision ) as SELL FOLLOWER. We also calculate the return differences between stock purchases and stock sales of the two trade portfolios (BUY -SELL FOLLOWER). In Panel B, we define the buys during the recent six months despite a downward revision (negative Rec_Revision , EPS_Revision or IR_Revision ) as BUY CONTRARIAN and the sells despite an upwardly revised prior-quarter forecast (positive Rec_Revision , EPS_Revision or IR_Revision ) as SELL CONTRARIAN. We also calculate the return differences between stock purchases and stock sales of the two trade portfolios (BUY -SELL CONTRARIAN). In Panel C, we present the difference in means of Panel A and Panel B. We display t-values of all means in parentheses. The symbols, ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively.
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Rec_Revision EPS_Revision IR_Revision
